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Abstract We introduce a generic framework for proof carrying code, developed and me-
chanically veriﬁed in Isabelle/HOL. The framework deﬁnes and proves sound
a veriﬁcation condition generator with minimal assumptions on the underlying
programming language, safety policy, and safety logic. We demonstrate its us-
ability for prototyping proof carrying code systems by instantiating it to a simple
assembly language with procedures and a safety policy for arithmetic overﬂow.
1 Introduction
Proof Carrying Code (PCC), ﬁrst proposed by Necula and Lee [11] [12], is a scheme
for executing untrusted code safely. Fig. 1 shows the architecture of a PCC system.
The code producer is on the left, the code receiver on the right. Both use a veriﬁcation
condition generator (VCG) that relies on annotations in the program to reduce the
program to a logic formula. The logic used in annotations and proof is the safety
logic, the property that is shown about the program is the safety policy.
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Figure 1. PCC Architecture
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It is the responsibility of the producer to generate the annotations and a proof for the
formula the VCG constructs. They are then transmitted to the code receiver who again
runs the VCG and uses a proof checker to verify that the proof indeed ﬁts the formula
produced by the VCG. Proof checking is much simpler and more efﬁcient than proof
searching. The framework for PCC systems we present in this paper concentrates on
the safety critical receiver side. It has the following two main purposes and contribu-
tions: safety of the system and prototyping new safety logics. Proof checker, VCG,
and safety logic constitute the trusted code base of the PCC system. Proof checkers
are relatively small standard components of many logical frameworks. The VCG on
the other hand is large (several thousand lines of C code in current PCC systems [6]
[13]) and complex (it handles annotations, produces complex formulae, and contains
parts of the safety policy). Our framework contains a VCG with a formal proof of
safety, mechanically checked in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [16]. The VCG is
not restricted to any particular machine language, safety policy, or safety logic. Addi-
tionally to the correctness of VCG and proof checker, we need the safety logic to be
sound. As a recent bug [9] in the SpecialJ system [6] shows, this is not trivial. It is
not even immediately clear, what exactly a safety logic must satisfy to be sound. Our
framework makes the underlying assumptions on machine, policy, and logic explicit.
It also makes a simple, formally clear statement what it means for a safety logic to be
sound: if the formula produced by the VCG is derivable in the safety logic, the pro-
gram must be safe according to the safety policy. The framework reduces the workload
for showing soundness of a safety logic by giving sufﬁcient conditions. Since the VCG
is directly executable and the framework reasonably easy to instantiate, it provides a
good platform for trying out, tuning, and analysing different safety policies and logics
for different target platforms.
Our approach is different from other work in the formal foundation of PCC by Appel
et al. [1] [2] or Hamid et al. [7] in that it works with an explicit, executable, and
veriﬁed VCG and not directly on the machine semantics or a type system. The focus
of the framework is on aiding logical foundations of PCC as the one started by Necula
and Schneck [14] and on encouraging the analysis of safety properties other than the
much researched type and memory safety. Necula and Schneck [15] also present a
framework for VCGs. They work with a small, trusted core VCG that can be extended
by optimised plugins. We see our work as complementary to this development: the
core VCG could be proven sound within our framework, the technique of using safe,
optimised extensions can then be applied to that sound core. On a broader scale, our
approach is related to other techniques that impose safety policies on machine code
statically: Typed Assembly Language [10], Mobile Ressource Guarantees [3] or Java
Bytecode Veriﬁcation [8].
There are four levels in our PCC systems. The ﬁrst level, the PCC framework (§2),
provides generic features and minimal assumptions. The second level is the platform
(§3). Platform designers can provide a concrete instantiation of the framework with
respect to a speciﬁc programming language, safety policy, and safety logic. The third
level is the code producer who can now write and certify programs based on the in-
stantiated framework. We show this by certifying a concrete program in §4. Finally,
also in §4, we show how code receivers can check certiﬁed code within the framework.
The formalization in this paper was carried out in Isabelle/HOL, so we inherit some of
Isabelle’s syntax. Most of the notation is familiar from functional programming and
standard mathematics, we only mention a few peculiarities. Consing an element x to
a list xs is written as x#xs. Inﬁx @ is the append operator, and xs ! n selects the n-thPrototyping Proof Carrying Code 3
element from the list xs. The type T1 ) T2 is the space of total functions from T1 to
T2, and we frequently use the polymorphic option type datatype 0a option = None j
Some 0a to simulate partiality in HOL, a logic of total functions: None stands for an
undeﬁned value, Some x for a deﬁned value x.
2 Framework Deﬁnition
The components of a PCC system shown in Fig. 1 depend on three factors: program-
ming language, safety policy, and safety logic. The programming language deﬁnes
syntax and semantics for programs, the safety policy speciﬁes the safety conditions
programs must satisfy, and the safety logic provides a formal notation and a deriva-
tion calculus for proving these conditions. Our framework consists of skeletons and
requirements for these three components and uses them to deﬁne and verify a generic
VCG.
2.1 Program Semantics
Our framework expects the semantics of the underlying programming language in
form of a function effS:: 0prog ) ((0pos  0mem)  (0pos  0mem)) set which relates
runtime states of a program to their immediate successor states. States are tuples (p;m)
of type 0pos  0mem, where p denotes the current position in the control ﬂow graph
and m is the machine’s memory, e.g., heap, stack and registers. Since 0prog, 0pos and
0mem are type variables the representation of programs, positions and memory can be
instantiated as one likes.
2.2 Safety Logic
To specify and prove properties about programs we use a safety logic.
x True y:: 0form
x
^
y
:: 0form list ) 0form
x False y:: 0form x =) y:: 0form ) 0form ) 0form
j= :: 0prog ) (0pos  0mem) ) 0form ) bool
` :: 0prog ) 0form ) bool
Every structure having constants for the truth values x True y and x False y, operators for
conjunction
x
^
y
and implication x =) y, judgements for validity j= and provability `
of formulae can be employed as a safety logic as long as it respects the assumptions
below. These assumptions only concern the semantics of the logical connectives. How
formulae or their proofs look like and what they mean, is left open. This depends on
how 0form, ` and j= get instantiated.
assumptions
semTrueF: ;s j= x True y semFalseF: : ;s j= x False y
semConj: ;s j=
x
^
y
Fs = (8 F2set Fs: ;s j= F)
semImpl: ;s j= (A x =) y B) = (;s j= A  ! ;s j= B)
2.3 Safety Policy
Ourframeworkexpectsthesafetypolicytobedeﬁnedbymeansofthesafetylogic. We
assume that for each position p in a program  a safety formula safeF  p expresses
the conditions we want to hold whenever we reach p at runtime.
safeF::0prog ) 0pos ) 0form4
In addition we assume that a safety logic formula initF  characterises all states under
which a program  can be started.
initF::0prog ) 0form
Now we can give a generic notion of safety for programs: A program is safe, if all
states (p;m) it reaches from some initial state are safe. That is (p;m) satisﬁes the
safety formula safeF  p, which the platform dedicates to position p.
isSafe  = (8p0 m0 p m: ;(p0;m0) j= initF  ^
((p0;m0);(p;m)) 2 (effS )  ! ;(p;m) j= safeF  p)
2.4 The Veriﬁcation Condition Generator
The VCG is the core of our PCC framework. It takes a program  and generates a
formula vc in the safety logic. If this formula is provable, then the program is safe at
runtime, i.e., isSafe  holds. The structure of the vc is determined by the program’s
control ﬂow graph, which is a directed graph. Nodes denote program positions and can
be marked with annotations. Edges point to successor positions and are marked with
branch conditions. Fig. 2 shows a control ﬂow graph. It can be seen as an abstraction
of the assembly program E, which compares two variables X and Y and eventually sets
X to the maximum of these two.
p￿0￿
p￿2￿ p￿1￿
B￿01￿ B￿02￿
B￿12￿
A￿
0￿
B￿20￿
E:
p0: JLE X Y 2
p1: INC X
p2: JMPB 2
Figure 2. control ﬂow graph
( To extract parts of the control ﬂow graph and to express the semantics of programs
by means of safety logic formulae and manipulations on these, our framework requires
various parameter functions:
anF:: 0prog ) (0pos ) 0form option)
succsF:: 0prog ) 0pos ) (0pos  0form) list
wpF:: 0prog ) 0pos ) 0pos ) (0form ) 0form)
domC:: 0prog ) 0pos list ipc:: 0prog ) 0pos
With anF we access the annotations; anF  p returns Some A if position p in  is
annotated with A, otherwise None. Function succsF yields the edges of the control
ﬂow graph. Given a position p in a program  the expression succsF  p yields a list
of pairs (p0;B) where p0 is a possible successor of p and B is the branch condition for
the edge from p to p0. The branch condition B is a safety logic formula that charac-
terises the situations when p0 is accessible from p. For example if  jumps from p to
either p0 or p00 depending on a condition C, then succsF  p should return something
like [(p0;C);(p00;: C)]. To reﬂect the semantics within the safety logic we use wpF,
a function for computing (weakest) preconditions. The formula wpF  p p0 Q is ex-
pected to characterises those states (p;m) that have successor states (p0;m0) satisfying
Q. The function domC is expected to yield the code domain of a program; this is a listPrototyping Proof Carrying Code 5
of all positions with instructions. Finally ipc is used to determine the initial program
counter.
( The vcg constructs the veriﬁcation condition out of so called inductive safety for-
mulae isafeF  p, which we generate individually for each position p in a program .
We call a state (p;m) inductively safe if it satisﬁes the inductive safety formula for p,
i.e., ;(p;m) j= isafeF  p. Fig. 3 deﬁnes isafeF  p. The wellformedness constraint
wf   !
isafeF  p = if p 2 set (domC )
then
x
^
y
[safeF  p] @
(case (anF  p)
of None ) (map((p0;B): B x =) y wpF  p p0(isafeF  p0))
(succsF  p))
j Some A ) [A])
else x False y
Figure 3. Construction of inductive safety formulae
wf  ensures that every loop in  has at least one annotation; otherwise the recursion
of isafeF would not terminate.
When p lies outside the code domain domC  we must never reach it at runtime. We
express this formally by returning the unsatisﬁable formula x False y in this case. For
positions p within the code domain the inductive safety formula guarantees the safety
formula safeF  p. In addition, if there is an annotation A at p, we conjoin the safety
formula with A. For example in program E from Fig. 2, we have the annotation A0 at
p0. Hence, we obtain
x
^
y
[safeF E p0; A0] for isafeF E p0.
If p is not annotated, we take all successor positions p0together with their branch con-
ditions B and recursively compute the inductive safety formulae isafeF  p0. Using
the wpF operator we construct a precondition wpF  p p0 (isafeF  p0). If this pre-
condition holds for a state (p;m) with some successor (p0;m0), then isafeF  p0 holds
for (p0;m0). By constructing implications of the form B x =) y (wpF  p p0 (isafeF 
p0)), we design the inductive safety formula isafeF  p such that all states satisfying
the branch condition B for a particular successor p0 also have to satisfy the precondi-
tion above. These implications are constructed for all pairs (p0;B) we get from succsF
 p. For example the positions p1 and p2 are not annotated in E. Below are their in-
ductive safety formulae, where safeF, wpF, branch conditions and annotations are not
expanded.
isafeF E p1 =
x
^
y
[ safeF E p1;
B12 x =) y wpF E p1 p2 (
x
^
y
[ safeF E p2; B20 x =) y wpF E p2 p0 (
x
^
y
[safeF E p0; A0])])]
isafeF E p2 =
x
^
y
[safeF E p2; B20 x =) y wpF E p2 p0 (
x
^
y
[safeF E p0; A0])]
Executing a program  with an inductively safe state (p;m) produces a trace of in-
ductively safe states until we reach an annotated position p0. The state (p0;m0) under
which we reach this position, is safe and satisﬁes the annotation. After this state the
execution could become unsafe. However, this does not happen if all successor states
of (p0;m0) are again inductively safe. This observation guides the construction of the
veriﬁcation condition vcg , which we show in Fig. 4. The veriﬁcation condition vcg
 demands two things: First, all initial states must satisfy the ﬁrst inductive safety for-
mula isafeF  (ipc ). Second, for every annotated position pa the inductive safety6
vcg  =
x
^
y([initF  x =) y (isafeF  (ipc ))]@
map(pa:
x
^
y
(map((p0;B):
x
^
y
[isafeF  pa; B] x =) y
wpF  pa p0(isafeF  p0))
(succsF  pa)))
[pa2 domC : anF  pa 6= None])
Figure 4. Veriﬁcation Condition Generator
formula isafeF  pa and the branch condition B for all successors p0of pa must guar-
antee the precondition wpF  pa p0(isafeF  p0). This ensures that the transitions out
of annotated positions leads to inductively safe successor states. As discussed above,
this proves the safety of . For example vcg E would have the following form:
x
^
y
[initF E x =) y isafeF E p0;
x
^
y
[isafeF E p0; B01] x =) y wpF E p0 p1 (isafeF E p1);
x
^
y[isafeF E p0; B02] x =) y wpF E p0 p2 (isafeF E p2)]
The ﬁrst conjunct expresses that initial states are inductively safe. Note that ipc E =
p0. Since p0 has two successors p1 and p2, which are accessible if B01 resp. B02 hold,
we have two further conjuncts. One requires us to show that all states satisfying the
inductive safety formula for p0 and the branch condition B01 can only have successor
states that satisfy the inductive safety formula for p1. The other is analogous for p2.
( The VCG is sound if for every well formed program  a provable veriﬁcation con-
dition  ` vcg  guarantees program safety, i.e., isSafe .
theorem wf  ^  ` vcg   ! isSafe 
We have proven this theorem in Isabelle based on the requirements our PCC frame-
work has on its parameter functions. In these assumptions, which we discuss in detail
in the appendix, we require that succsF approximates the control ﬂow, that wpF yields
proper preconditions and that the safety logic is correct.
3 Framework Instantiation
In this section we instantiate the framework with a simple assembly language (SAL).
We show how HOL can be instantiated as safety logic and demonstrate it on a safety
policy that prohibits type errors and arithmetical overﬂows.
3.1 A Simple Assembly Language
SAL provides instructions for arithmetics, pointers, jumps, and procedures. We
distinguish two kinds of addresses. Locations, which we model as natural numbers,
identify memory cells, whereas positions identify places in a program. We denote
positions as pairs (pn;i), where i is the relative position inside the procedure with
name pn.
types loc = nat, pname = nat, pos = pname  nat
datatype instr =SET loc nat j ADD loc loc j SUB loc loc j MOV loc loc j
JMPL loc loc nat j JMPB nat j CALL loc pname j RET loc j HALTPrototyping Proof Carrying Code 7
The instructions manipulate states of the form (p;(m;e)), where p denotes the pro-
gram counter and (m;e) the system memory. Since pairs associate to the right in
Isabelle/HOL we often leave out the inner brackets and write (p;m;e) to denote a state
with program counter p, main memory m and environment e.
types SALstate = pos  (loc ) tval)  env
The program counter stores the position of the instruction that is executed next. The
main memory m, which maps locations to typed values, stores all the data a program
works on. We have three kinds of values: Uninitialised values having type ILLEGAL,
natural numbers NAT n, and positions POS (pn;i).
datatype tval = ILLEGAL j NAT nat j POS pos
The environment e tracks information about the run of a program. It contains a call
stack cs e, which lists the memory contents and times under which currently active
procedures have been called, and a history h e, which traces the values of program
counters.
record env = cs :: (nat  (loc ) tval)) list
h :: pos list
To update a ﬁeld x in a record r with an expression E we write r(jx:=Ej), to access it we
write x r. We use the environment like a history variable in Hoare Logic; it provides
valuable information for annotations written as predicates on states. We can describe
states by relating them to former states or refer to system resources,e.g., the length of
h e is a time measure.
A SAL program is a list of procedures, which consist of a name pname and a list of
possibly annotated instructions. Annotations are predicates on states.
types SALform = SALstate ) bool
SALprocedure = pname  ((instr  (SALform option)) list)
SALprogram = SALprocedure list
To access instructions we write cmd  p, which gives us Some ins if  has an instruc-
tion ins at p, or None otherwise.
3.2 SAL Semantics
SAL Instructions do the following: SET X n initialises X with NAT n. ADD X Y and
SUB X Y add and subtract the values at X and Y storing the result in X. MOV X Y
interprets the values of X and Y as addresses a and b; it copies the value at a to b.
JMPL X Y t jumps t positions forward if the value at X is less than the value at Y;
otherwise just one. JMPB t jumps t positions backwards. CALL X pn jumps into
procedure pn leaving the return address in X. RET X leaves a procedure and returns to
the address expected in X. Finally, HALT stops execution. In the instantiation of effS
we formalise these effects.
effS  = f(s;s0) j step  s = Some s0g
We do this with an auxiliary expression step  (p;m;e), which yields Some (p0;m0;e0)
if the instruction cmd  p exists and yields the successor state (p0;m0;e0). For example
ADD X Y updates X with (m X)(m Y), which is ILLEGAL if either X or Y contains
no number or NAT (a+b) if m X = NAT a and m Y = NAT b. In addition the history
is augmented with the current program counter.8
cmd  (pn;i) = Some ADD X Y  ! step  ((pn;i);m;e) =
= Some ((pn;i+1);m[X7!(m X)(m Y)];e(jh:=(h e)@(pn;i)j))
The other instructions can be handled in a similar fashion.
3.3 SAL Safety Policy
In initial states the program counter is (0;0), the main memory only contains unini-
tialised values and the environment e has an empty history and a copy of the initial
memory on its call stack.
initF  = (p;m;e): p=(0;0) ^ 8X: m X=ILLEGAL ^ h e=[] ^ cs e=[(0;m)]
States are safe if the current instruction respects type safety and does not produce an
arithmetic overﬂow, that is numerical results are less than MAX. Example:
cmd  p = Some (ADD X Y)  !
safeF  p = (p;m;e): (9n: (m X)(m Y)=NAT n ^ n  MAX)
For the sake of brevity we skip the remaining instructions.
3.4 SAL Safety Logic
By identifying assertions with HOL predicates, we instantiate a shallow embedded
safety logic in Fig. 5. The valididy judgment j= is directly deﬁned by applying a
predicate to a state. The argument  is only there to be compatible with the generic
signature of the framework. We deﬁne the provability judgment ` directly by means
of the semantics. This enables us to prove veriﬁcation conditions with Isabelle/HOL’s
inference rules using various tactics and decision procedures as tools. Alternatively
we could also use a deep embedding and deﬁne ` with an explicit proof calculus,
possibly tailored to the programming language and its safety policy. This means more
effort, but could pay off in form of shorter proofs or higher degree of automation in
proof search. However, this paper focuses on the framework and we rather keep the
instantiation simple. According to ` a formula F is provable iff it holds for all states
x True y = s: True
x
^
y
fs = s: 8F 2 set fs: F s
x False y = s: False A x =) y B = s: A s  ! B s
;s j= F = F s  ` F = 8s: s 2 isafe   ! ;s j= F
Figure 5. Safety Logic for SAL.
in isafe . The inductively deﬁned set isafe  contains all initial states and states
that originate from a computation where all states are inductively safe.
;(p;m) j= initF   ! (p;m) 2 isafe 
(p;m) 2 isafe  ^ ;(p;m) j= isafeF  p ^ ;(p0;m0) j= isafeF  p0^
((p;m);(p0;m0)) 2 effS   ! (p0;m0) 2 isafe 
This constraint on states simpliﬁes proofs and shortens annotations, because one can
derive properties of a state from the fact that this state can be reached at runtime by
only traversing inductively safe intermediate states.
3.5 Instantiating VCG helper functions
The instantiations of anF, domC and ipc are straightforward. More interesting are wpF
and succsF. For the instantiation of wpF we use -abstraction to postpone substitution
of formulae to the veriﬁcation stage. Example:Prototyping Proof Carrying Code 9
cmd  p = Some (ADD X Y)  ! wpF  p p0Q =
(p;m;e): let m0=m[X 7! (m X)(m Y)]; e0=e(jh:=(h e)@pj) in Q (p0;m0;e0)
We compute the effect of ADD X Y on some symbolic state (p;m;e) and demand that
Q holds for the resulting state. Finally, we have a glimpse of the succsF instantiation.
Here, we chose JMPL as example:
cmd  (pn;i) = Some (JMPL X Y t)  ! succsF  (pn;i) =
[((pn;i+t);(p;m;e): 9n n0: m X=NAT n ^ m Y=NAT n0^ n<n0^ p=(pn;i));
((pn;i+1);(p;m;e): 9n n0: m X=NAT n ^ m Y=NAT n0^ :n<n0^ p=(pn;i))]
Theconstraintontheprogramcounterp=(pn;i)inthebranchconditionshelpstoapply
system invariants. These are properties that hold for all states in isafe  irrespective
of . For example ((pn;i);m;e): cmd  (pn;i) = Some (RET X)  ! (9k m0css: cs e
= (k;m0)#css ^ cmd  (h e)!k = (CALL pn X)) is a system invariant. It says that for
the call time k of the current procedure the history h e records the position of a CALL
instruction.
3.6 Verifying Procedures
Procedure proofs should be modular. Code with procedure calls should only depend
on these procedure’s speciﬁcations (the annotations at entry and exit positions) and
not on their code. For example (p;m;e): m X = (( m e) X  (NAT 1) might be the
postcondition of a procedure that increments a location X. Here we use ( m e = snd
(hd (cs e)) to reconstruct the memory at call time.This procedure could be called from
a position where X is NAT 5. The programmer expects that after the procedure X is
NAT 6 and could write this into the annotation at the return point. In the veriﬁcation
condition we would have to prove that this follows from the procedure’s postcondition.
However (p;m;e): m X = (( m e) X  (NAT 1) x =) y ((p;m;e): m X = NAT 6) is not
provable. The information that X has been NAT 5 at the procedures entry point is
missing. We cannot add this information into the postcondition, otherwise we loose
modularity. A way out is to pack call context dependent information into branch
conditions, which succsF computes individually for each successor. If a procedure
returns to (pn0;i0+1) and (pn0;i0) is annotated with Ac we can construct the branch
condition (p;m;e): Ac (( pc e;( m e; ( e e), which claims that (( pc e;( m e;( e e), the state at
call time, satisﬁes the annotation Ac. Note that ( pc and ( e, the position and environment
at call time, can be deﬁned analogously to ( m. Since branch conditions are added to
inductive safety formulas, we now obtain a provable formula: (
x
^
y [(p;m;e): m X =
(( m e) X  (NAT 1) ; (p;m;e): (( m e) X = NAT 5]) x =) y ( (p;m;e): m X = NAT 6).
Call context dependent branch conditions involve some technicalities for the deﬁnition
and veriﬁcation of succsF. However, they ﬁt neatly into our concept of a generic VCG.
We achieve modular procedure proofs although our VCG has no notion of procedures
at all.
4 Case Study: Overﬂow Detection
4.1 Motivating Example for Overﬂow Detection
The exemplary safety policy expressed the deﬁnition of safeF in §3.3 has two aspects:
First, type safety is needed as a general property to ensure that SAL programs never
get stuck. Second, the safety formula demands that the result of arithmetic operations
does not exceed MAX, thus preventing overﬂows. Consider the following program10
fragment: [CALL P CHECK; ADD B C]
It might be part of an application that tries to add a credit stored as a natural number
in memory location C to a balance in B—for example as part of a load transaction of
a smart card purse. Before executing the addition, a procedure CHECK is called to
ensure that the new balance in B is less than MAX; if it does, the credit in C will be set
to zero and thus the balance remains the same as before. Special care has to be taken
in the implementation of CHECK:
[SET M MAX; SET H 0; ADD H B; ADD H C; JMPL H M 2; SET C 0; RET P]
M represents the maximum balance considered for the application. H should contain
B + C after the second ADD statement. If the check B + C < M fails, the credit
is set to zero; otherwise it is left unchanged. Even this simple example contains an
implementation ﬂaw: there could be an overﬂow in H. And the ﬂaw is not merely
theoretical: in the case of a silent overﬂow as in Java it would lead to debiting the
purse instead of crediting.
4.2 Annotated SAL Program
Fig. 6 shows the corrected and annotated version of our example. The main procedure
and CHECK are now identiﬁed with 0 and 1. For better readability we write instruc-
tion/annotation pairs of the form (ins; None) as just ins and (ins; Some A) as fAg ins.
OD = [(0;[SET B b0; SET C c0;
f(p;m;e): m B = NAT b0 ^ m C = NAT c0g
CALL P 1;
f(p;m;e): m B = NAT b0 ^ (9c: m C = NAT c ^
c = (if b0 + c0 < MAX then c0 else 0))g
ADD B C; HALT ])
(1;[ f(p;m;e): m P = POS (incA (
( pc e)) ^ (9b: m B = NAT b) ^
(9c: m C = NAT c) ^ (8X: X 6= P  ! m X =
( m e X)g
SET M MAX; SUB M C; JMPL B M 2; SET C 0;
f(p;m;e): (8X: X 6= C ^ X 6= M ^ X 6= P  ! m X =
( m e X) ^
(9b c c
0: m B = NAT b ^ m C = NAT c ^
( m e C = NAT c
0^
c = (if b + c
0< MAX then c
0else 0))g
RET P ])]
Figure 6. Corrected and annotated program OD.
Before execution of CALL P 1, the memory positions B and C contain the numbers
b0 and c0. The annotation for ADD B C states that the value of C may have changed
according to the condition b0 + c0 < MAX.
Inside the CHECK procedure we ﬁrst set the memory location M to the maximum
balance. The annotation states that location P stores the proper return address for
the procedure: incA (( pc e) represents the program counter of the calling procedure
incremented by one. Furthermore the annotation states that there are natural numbers
in both B and C, and that all memory locations except P are the same as in the caller.
The following statements require no annotations, only the exit point of the procedure
RET P does: it states that all values except for those in C, M, and P are unchanged,
that there are natural numbers in both B and C, and that the new value of C will be
changed to zero if the new balance exceeds the maximum balance.Prototyping Proof Carrying Code 11
4.3 Veriﬁcation Condition
In Fig. 7 we show the part of the veriﬁcation condition that is generated for the re-
turn from procedure CHECK. In general we get as many parts (conjuncts) as there
are paths between annotated positions. That means the size of veriﬁcation conditions
is linear to the number of positions if all branch positions are annotated. The exam-
x
^
y
[
1
x
^
y
[ (p;m;e): 9pn
0i
0: m P = POS (pn
0;i
0+1) ^
(9k m
0cl css: cs e = (k; m
0)#cl#css ^ (pn
0;i
0) = (h e)!k);
2 (p;m;e): (8X: X 6= C ^ X 6= M ^ X 6= P  ! m X =
( m e X) ^
(9b c c
0: m B = NAT b ^ m C = NAT c ^
( m e C = NAT c
0^
c = if b + c
0< MAX then c
0else 0];
3
x
^
y
[ (p;m;e): m P = POS (0;2) ^ p=(1;4);
4 (p;m;e):(((p;m;e): m B = NAT b0 ^ m C = NAT c0) (
( pc e;
( m e;
( e e))]
]
5
x =) y
x
^
y
[ (p;m;e): 9n: (m B)(m C) = NAT n ^ n  MAX;
6 (p;m;e): m B = NAT b0 ^ 9c: m C = NAT c ^
c = if b + c0 < MAX then c0 else 0]
Figure 7. Fragment of the veriﬁcation condition.
ple demonstrates again how the VCG works. On the top-level the conditions for the
annotated program positions are conjoined; the fragment refers to position p=(1;4)
of our program, 1 stands for the procedure CHECK and 4 for the line number with
the statement RET P. There is only one successor p0=(0;2), which is the statement
ADD B C. Therefore the conjunction over the list of all successors collapses to one
element. The veriﬁcation condition fragment shown in Fig. 7 results from the expres-
sion
x
^
y
[isafeF OD (1;4); B] x =) y wpF OD (1;4) (0;2) (isafeF OD (0;2)) where B is the
branch condition of succsF OD (1;4). Numbers 1–4 in Fig. 7 correspond to the as-
sumption of the implication, numbers 5–6 to the conclusion. isafeF OD (1;4) results
in
x
^
y[safeF OD (1;4); Ae] (compare Fig. 3), where safeF OD (1;4) corresponds to 1
and the annotation Ae, e.g., anF OD (1;4) = Some Ae, corresponds to 2. The branch
condition B for RET P appears in 3 and 4, and consists of
x
^
y
[ (p;m;e): m P = POS
(0;2) ^ p=(1;4); (p;m;e): Ac (
( pc e;
( m e;
( e e)] where (p;m;e): Ac (( pc e; ( m e; ( e e) is the
annotation of the call instruction, e.g., anF OD (0;1) = Some Ac, applied to the re-
constructed state at the moment of the call, and P is the memory location of the return
address. This shows again how the environment e enables us to reconstruct the call
state (( pc e; ( m e; ( e e) and how to transfer the information Ac of the call point to the
return point. Note that this context-speciﬁc information is encoded into the branch
condition B, which succsF computes individually for each successor. The annotation
at the procedure’s return point does not refer to a particular call point. Hence, the pro-
cedure and its veriﬁcation are modular. The conclusion of the veriﬁcation condition
consists of the safety condition for ADD in 5 and its annotation in 6; together they
form isafeF OD (0;2).
4.4 Code Producer and Consumer
The code producer can write annotated programs in Isabelle. To obtain the veriﬁcation
condition one can generate and execute ML code for the VCG [5] or use the simpliﬁer12
to evaluate vcg . Proving the veriﬁcation condition is supported by powerful proof
tools and a rich collection of HOL theorems. For the example in Fig. 6 the simpliﬁer
and a decision procedure for presburger arithmetic sufﬁce to prove the veriﬁcation
condition. For the client side Isabelle provides (compressed) proof terms and a proof
checker [4]. Proofs are encoded as  terms having a type that corresponds to the
theorem they prove (Curry Howard Isomorphism). Proof Checking becomes a type
checking problem, which can be handled by a small trusted program.
5 Conclusion
Our framework can be instantiated to various programming languages, safety policies,
and safety logics. As long as the requirements of the framework are satisﬁed, one can
directly apply our generic VCG and rely on its machine checked soundness proof. In
our instantiation to SAL we show how HOL can be embedded as safety logic and how
this can be used to verify the absence of arithmetic overﬂows. Since HOL is very ex-
pressive, formulating complex assertions or safety policies is possible. Isabelle’s code
generator gives us an executable version of the VCG. Using the built in tools for proof
search, proof terms and proof checking we can simulate producer and client activities.
Before one embarks on a particular PCC implementation, one can build a prototype in
our framework and prove the soundness of the safety logic. On our web page [19] we
present more complex examples and instantiations of our framework. These include
programs with pointer arithmetic or recursive procedures and safety policies about
time and memory consumption of programs. Moreover we have instantiated a safety
logic based on ﬁrst order arithmetic in form of a deep embedding [18]. There, for-
mulae are modelled as HOL datatype and can by analysed by other HOL functions.
This enables us to optimise veriﬁcation conditions after/during their construction. By
now, we also have instantiated the PCC framework to a (downsized) version of the
Java Virtual Machine [17]. For this we did not have to change the framework, thus we
believe that our framework’s formalisation and its requirements are reasonable, even
for real life platforms.Prototyping Proof Carrying Code 13
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Appendix: Requirements
Our PCC framework makes some assumptions on the functions it takes as parameters
(cf. p.4). Based on these assumptions we prove the generic VCG correct. It is the task
of the framework instantiator to make sure that the implementations of the parameter
functions satisfy the requirements listed below. We have proven in Isabelle that these
requirements hold for our instantiation to SAL. Hence, we have a PCC system for SAL
with a mechanically veriﬁed trusted code base. Note that none of the requirements in-
volves the safety policy safeF. Hence it is very easy to instantiate our framework to
different safety policies.
Assumption correctWpF ensures that wpF computes proper preconditions. That is for
every state (p;m) having a successor state (p0;m0), we require that Q holds for (p0;m0)
whenever wpF  p p0Q holds for (p;m). We require this property only for wellformed
programs  and for states in isafe  , a set of states we introduce in §3.4.
assumption correctWpF:
wf  ^ (p;m) 2 isafe  ^ ((p;m);(p0;m0))2(effS ) ^
;(p;m) j= (wpF  p p0Q)  ! ;(p0;m0) j= Q
Although the set isafe  seems to complicate matters at a ﬁrst sight, it simpliﬁes
the instantiator’s job of proving the requirements. Only initial states and safe states
originating from a safe execution must be considered. We can conclude information
about these states from inductive safety formulae of previous states.
Assumption correctIpc demands that ipc and initF ﬁt together:
assumption correctIpc: ;(p;m) j= initF   ! p = ipc 
In succsF complete we assume that succsF covers all transitions of effS and yields
branch conditions that hold whenever a particular transition is accessible. Again, this
is only required for wellformed programs and states in isafe .
assumption succsF-complete:
wf  ^ (p;m) 2 isafe  ^ ((p;m);(p0;m0)) 2 effS 
 ! (9 B: (p0;B) 2 set (succsF  p) ^ ;(p;m) j= B)
In correctSafetyLogic the safety logic’s provability judgement is constrained such that
provable formulae are guaranteed to hold for states in isafe.
assumption correctSafetyLogic:
 ` f ^ (p;m) 2 isafe   ! ;(p;m) j= f
Based on these assumptions we can prove that our VCG is sound. A provable veriﬁ-
cation condition gurantess safety of a program at runtime.
theorem vcg-soundness:
[[ wf ;  ` vcg  ]] =) isSafe 
To prove this theorem we have to show that all states that are reachable in effS 
from an initial state are safe. This follows from lemma vc-isafeP, which says that in
a wellformed program  with provable veriﬁcation condition all states (p;m) that are
reachable from an initial state (p0;m0) are in isafe . From the deﬁnition of isafePrototyping Proof Carrying Code 15
 we know that (p;m) is inductively safe or an initial state. In the ﬁrst case we know
that (p;m) is safe, because the safety formula safeF is part of every inductive safety
formula. In the second case the veriﬁcation condition guarantees that all initial states
are inductively safe.
lemma vc-isafeP:
wf  ^  ` vcg  ^ ;(p0;m0) j= initF   !
8 p m: ((p0;m0);(p;m)) 2 (effS ) ^ n  ! (p;m) 2 (isafe )
To prove vc-isafeP we induct on n. After a few cosmetic simpliﬁcations we obtain the
following two proof obligations:
(1) wf  ^  ` vcg  ^ ;(p0; m0) j= initF 
 ! ((p0; m0); pc; m) 2 effS  ^ 0  ! (pc; m) 2 isafe 
(2) wf  ^  ` vcg  ^ ;(p0; m0) j= initF  ^
(8pc m: ((p0; m0); pc; m) 2 effS  ^ n  ! (pc; m) 2 isafe )
 ! ((p0; m0); pc; m) 2 effS  ^ (n+1)  ! (pc; m) 2 isafe 
In the ﬁrst obligation the state (p;m) is equal to (p0;m0) and we get (p;m) 2 (isafe
) by applying the ﬁrst introduction rule of isafe. In the second obligation, we
conclude that (p;m) has a predecessor (pi;mi) that is reachable from (p0;m0) in n steps.
This allows us to apply our induction hypotheses and we obtain (pi;mi) 2 (isafe ).
From the introduction rules of isafe we know that (pi;mi) is either an initial state or
reachable from an initial state by only traversing inductively safe states. In both cases
(pi;mi) is inductively safe, i.e. ;(pi;mi) j= isafeF  pi. If (pi;mi) is an initial state we
get this from the veriﬁcation condition, otherwise we get it directly from the premise
of the second introduction rule of isafe.
We can assume that pi is in the code domain domC . Otherwise isafeF  pi would
collapses to x False y and could not hold because of semFalseF. If pi is not annotated
the goal isafeF  p follows directly from the design of isafeF. Otherwise, if there is
an annotation at pi, we know that the veriﬁcation condition contains a conjunct of the
form
x
^
y
[isafeF  pi;B] x =) y wpF  pi p (isafeF  p), where (p;B) 2 succsF 
pi. To establish (p;B) 2 (succsF  p) we can use the assumption succsF-complete.
Since we have all conditions on the left hand side of this implication, we can conclude
;(pi;mi) j= wpF  pi p (isafeF  p) by semImpl. Then correctWpF ensures that our
goal ;(p;m) j= (p;m) holds. Q.E.D.